The paradox of liberalization – understanding dualism and the recovery of the German political economy by Hassel, Anke
A New Concept of European Federalism 
 
 
 
LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper Series 
The paradox of liberalization – 
Understanding dualism and the recovery of 
the German political economy 
Anke Hassel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEQS Paper No. 42/2011 
September 2011 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the 
views of the editors or the LSE. 
© Anke Hassel 
Editorial Board 
Dr. Joan Costa-i-Font 
Dr. Mareike Kleine 
Dr. Jonathan White 
Ms. Katjana Gattermann 
 
Anke Hassel 
                                                                                                                                       
The paradox of liberalization – 
Understanding dualism and the 
recovery of the German political 
economy 
Anke Hassel*  
 
Abstract 
What do the recent trends in German economic development convey about the trajectory of 
change? Has liberalization prepared the German economy to deal with new challenges? What 
effects will liberalization have on the coordinating capacities of economic institutions? This 
paper argues that coordination and liberalization are two sides of the same coin in the process 
of corporate restructuring in the face of economic shocks. Firms seek labour cooperation in 
the face of tighter competitive pressures and exploit institutional advantages of coordination. 
However, tighter cooperation with core workers sharpened insider-outsider divisions and 
were built upon service sector cost cutting through liberalization. The combination of plant-
level restructuring and social policy change forms a trajectory of institutional adjustment of 
forming complementary economic segments which work under different rules. The process is 
driven by producer coalitions of export-oriented firms and core workers’ representatives 
rather than by firms per se. 
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1
The paradox of liberalization – 
Understanding dualism and the 
recovery of the German political 
economy 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the rapid changes in non-liberal market economies of the mid-1990s 
doubts have emerged about the distinctiveness of the Varieties of Capitalism 
literature (VoC) as a useful conceptual paradigm (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). 
There were those who assumed that globalization – in the sense of market 
expansion, technological diffusion and closer integration – would sooner or 
later lead to a convergence of political economies. Institutional distinctions 
were merely seen as relicts from previous stages of economic development 
which were to be discarded in due course. 
Among the more fine-tuned observers, globalization was seen as having an 
ambivalent effect on coordinated market economies. On the one hand, further 
opening  national economies to international trade reinforces economic 
specialization,  thereby making countries more dependent on their 
comparative economic advantages, and leads to further protection of 
institutional advantages by firms and economic interest organizations 
(Franzese and Mosher, 2001; Hassel, 2007; Thelen and van Wjinbergen, 2003; 
Wood, 2001). On the other hand, increasing financial internationalization 
might lead to the opposite effect. The rise of global investors and impatient 
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capital even in countries with protected corporate finance would eventually 
lead to higher performance expectations and an increase in shareholder value 
expectations in firms of coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Höpner, 2001).  
In addition, challenges to non-liberal institutions came from other sources. 
First, policy changes related to the liberalization of product and labour 
markets during privatization of public utilities and activation of the long-term 
unemployed might undermine existing patterns of coordination. Second, 
structural changes to post-industrial economies also have repercussions on 
institutional reproduction. Third, service sector employees and the increase of 
female labour market participation rates in non-liberal economies might give 
rise to a different demand for redistribution and social security. 
At the same time there is disagreement in the literature on the interpretation 
of the empirical evidence. What accounts for a major institutional break? 
What share of a national political economy must be covered by an 
institutional pattern in order to classify it as distinct from other economies? Is 
the decline of membership in trade unions and employers’ associations a sign 
of decline in coordination? Are service sector skills more likely to be general 
skills? Is redistribution an indicator for coordination? Is micro-level 
coordination a functional equivalent to macro-level coordination?  
Cross-country comparisons show that coordinated market economies today 
are less egalitarian than before, increasingly divergent, and their institutions 
less encompassing. They remain different from liberal market economies in 
the following ways: capital markets remain underdeveloped, labour markets 
are more regulated, pay setting is still coordinated, trade unions remain much 
stronger and social spending generally higher. Recent discussions about the 
‘commonalities’ of capitalism rather than differences focussing on dynamic 
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trends across all market economies, indicate a departure from the all-
pervasive theoretical assumptions of the comparative capitalism literature 
(Streeck, 2010). 
This paper investigates the current avenues of VoC theorizing using the case 
of institutional change and economic performance in Germany. It questions 
the kind of contribution recent patterns of liberalization have had on 
economic institutions and performance and what processes of liberalization 
alter the configuration of economic institutions. 
An analysis of the German political economy’s transformation since 
reunification shows economic shocks have driven plant-level actors to pursue 
radical cost cutting and productivity increases by exploiting existing patterns 
of plant-level cooperation. Intensified plant-level cooperation led to 
employment guarantees for core workers which insulated them from 
previous demands for strong social security provisions. In turn, persistent 
outsourcing to low cost countries and low cost service sectors has added to 
liberalization in other parts of the economy, particularly through the use of 
fringe workers. Manufacturing firms, with the tacit support of their works 
councils, supported firms in service industries that lobbied for more liberal 
employment rules for non-core segments of the workforce. When the German 
government pursued activation strategies on the labour market, core firms 
and core workers did not veto the proposed measure of liberalization.  
Thus, sustained economic coordination has facilitated, and to some extent 
required, liberalization in some areas for cost containment, more flexible 
corporate finance and numerical flexibility of the workforce. As a 
consequence of the benefits of coordination, firms actively pursued a strategy 
of separation of the workforce, which divided employees into core and fringe 
workers. Liberalization did not occur despite strong resistance by key 
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beneficiaries of social policy, but rather was accepted and supported as a 
precondition for sustained coordination.  
Moreover, this paper points out that the recent comeback of the German 
economy owes more to the institutional foundations of the ‘old’ German 
model than to the liberalizing policies of the early 2000s. Policy tools and 
firms’ strategies to overcome the crisis were built upon patterns of plant-level 
cooperation that German firms have pursued for the last two decades. It 
therefore turns out that coordination and liberalization are not opposites or 
mutually exclusive processes but complementary.1  
 
2. Convergence and divergence in VoC, sources of 
liberalization and policy preferences  
There was a period of convergence in theorizing and researching the various 
strands of the VoC literature that took place during a phase of relative 
stability and continuity in advanced industrialized countries between the mid 
to late 1980s and  the late 2000s (Amable, 2003; Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Hall 
and Soskice, 2001). Many scholars’ analyses of institutional configurations in 
national political economies strongly emphasised the interdependence 
between the mode of corporate finance and the innovation and usage of 
human resources within firms competing in international markets. They 
concluded non-liberal forms of market economies displayed a number of 
starkly contrasting features to liberal Anglo-American countries, such as 
concentrated ownership of firms through block-holding, bank-finance, plant-
level cooperation between workers and managers, higher levels and more 
                                                        
1 See also Herrigel (2010) with a related argument.  
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specific skills in core industries and pathways of specialization in different 
technologies and industries.   
Some level of disagreement on the foundations and origins of diverse 
economic institutions has always prevailed. Different perspectives 
emphasised micro versus macro level approaches, the use of rational choice 
assumptions and large n-comparisons with few historical case studies. In 
particular, approaches focusing on the firm’s role as a micro-level actor 
espousing rationally based preferences and assuming  institutional equilibria 
were in contrast to macro-level studies of institutions emphasizing power 
resource (PR) approaches in historically unique settings over long periods of 
time. PR approaches perceived non-liberal economic institutions as a result of 
the rise of left of centre political parties in cooperation with strong trade 
unions. These coalitions pushed for economic institutions at distinct historical 
turning points when business was bound (Korpi, 2006). In contrast, VoC 
approaches in a rational choice tradition (VoC-RC) see the evolution of 
economic institutions as a self-reinforcing process of firms’ quest for 
conquering market niches, innovation and productivity. All the while, the 
commonalities in the discussions tended to be greater than the criticism of 
their assumptions.  
However, since the mid-1990s, advanced political economies have started to 
display rather strong evidence of institutional change, particularly in 
continental European non-liberal market economies. Most countries’ 
governments have implemented reforms of labour market policy (Bonoli, 
2010), unemployment insurance (Clegg, 2007) and pensions (Häusermann, 
2010), altering the patterns, if not scale, of social spending and the social 
security position of workers. Labour market regulation was weakened for 
labour market outsiders by facilitating temporary work, while many 
regulations were kept for labour market insiders. VoC literature has 
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underlined how the protection of specific skills, inherent to the generous and 
far reaching status-securing unemployment benefit systems and strong 
employment protection, helped workers to invest in specific skills (Estevez-
Abe et al., 2001). Government tended to dismantle these provisions when they 
started to address low labour market participation rates and rising long-term 
unemployment. 
Capital markets and corporate governance regulations have been the subject 
of intense reform pressure. Beginning in the mid-1990s, many governments 
liberalized capital markets towards liberal market economies (Culpepper, 
2010). In some cases, reform was radical and far-reaching, while in others, 
reform steps were less radical and incremental. Corporate finance shifted 
slightly towards equity finance, and some large national champions defined 
themselves as shareholder value firms similar to their Anglo-American 
counterparts. 
Structural changes to the labour market towards deindustrialization and 
labour market deregulation also weakened the position of trade unions. 
Union membership figures declined substantially across almost all 
industrialized countries. Employers’ associations lost members, collective 
bargaining coverage declined, and collective bargaining practices changed. 
While centralized collective bargaining survived in most places, the contents 
of collective agreements were less regulated than before and delegated more 
decision making rights to a lower level.  
Plant-based vocational training, another prominent feature of non-liberal 
capitalism, declined and a steady trend towards higher and tertiary education 
lured school leavers away from mid-level specific skills. In other words, the 
fundamental institutions non-liberal market economies were meant to rest 
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changed profoundly in the direction of increasing liberalization and 
deregulation (Streeck, 2009). 
The literature provides different approaches to the causes, mechanisms and 
effects of these changes. Earlier contributions pointed out the effects of 
globalization as a liberalizing force because it increases the likelihood of 
concession bargaining through firms’ better exit alternatives. However, as 
Thelen and van Wijnbergen (2005) have demonstrated, though globalization 
increases the vulnerability of export oriented firms, their dependence on 
labour has grown rather than decreased. The effects of capital market 
liberalization and the rise of shareholder value on the behaviour of large firms 
has indicated a trend towards more liberal practices, in particular  off-shoring 
and outsourcing (Beyer and Hassel, 2002).  
On the whole, the discussion moved towards previously unresolved issues, 
such as the role of the state in modern market economies (Rhodes and 
Molinas, 2007), the role of political power relations and the economic and 
political preferences of firms towards constraining regulations. These factors 
became increasingly important for explaining institutional change (Hancke et 
al., 2007).  
As the transformation of CMEs accelerated, the underlying conflict in the 
literature between PR approaches and VoC-RC approaches reappeared. PR 
perspectives would see a shift towards liberalization as a strategy pursued by 
business as a matter of principle to diminish the effects of constraining 
regulation and trade union demands for redistribution and restricted 
practices. Liberalization would be made possible by shifts in partisanship of 
governments and coalitions between business and governing parties at the 
expense of labour.  
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In contrast, authors using the VoC-RC approach would expect trends towards 
liberalization arising from conflicting preferences within the business 
community, such as financial market actors versus manufacturing firms. 
Financial market actors in non-liberal systems seeking new sources of 
corporate finance would pressure management for more short-term profits 
and therefore faster turn-over of staff and production cycles. They would 
expect much less drive towards liberalization within non-liberal market 
economies, as long as business interests were well served by existing 
institutions (Wood, 2001).  
Both types of approaches, VoC-RC and PR, would acknowledge changes to 
market constraining institutions in non-liberal market economies can occur in 
spheres linked to production regimes, but dominated by different political 
preferences. They would acknowledge policy changes can be driven by actors 
other than those dominating a production regime. Moreover, there are a 
number of authors writing about institutional change in VoC who are 
agnostic between the two. They share the criticism that rational choice based 
VoC literature tends to be functionalist, non-historical and lacking a notion of 
power without subscribing to the full theoretical repertoire of the PR 
perspective (Hall and Thelen, 2008). Taking a micro-level perspective and 
aggregating micro-preferences to the level of collectively organized interest 
representation, these authors recognize the importance of political conflict 
and power relations in a historical context.2  
Their explanatory approach model can be depicted as a third alternative 
focusing on producer coalitions (VoC-PC) comprised of firms and workers 
ready to pursue their interests at the expense of other groups in the market 
(Carlin and Soskice, 2009; Iversen and Soskice, 2009; Palier and Thelen, 2008).   
                                                        
2 Streeck 2009 and 2010 argues that market expansion is an inherent tendency of market 
societies and is largely disconnected from immediate business preferences.  
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The analytical difference between the approaches is key to understanding 
institutional change, because it gives an indication of actors’ intentions as well 
as the intended extent and possible effects of liberalization. From a VoC 
perspective, liberalization will remain patchy and -- largely due to ‘liberal’ 
influences – stem from capital markets. From a PR view, business will push 
for liberalization, even if it comes at the expense of benefits deriving from 
constraining institutions. A VoC-PC approach would assume that insiders 
would use their power positions to exploit cost advantages, but would also 
accommodate liberalizing policy change if it serves their interests.  
The claim that producer coalitions are particularly well placed to shape 
policies in coordinated market economies is backed by other research. 
Producer coalitions (firms and their core workers) have had privileged access 
to policy making arenas in coordinated market economies through the self-
administration of social insurance schemes, in which unions and employers 
organisations are represented. Members of parliamentary committees for 
work, welfare and employment were traditionally affiliated to either unions 
or employers’ organisations (Trampusch, 2005).  
Moreover, as Chang et al. (2010) have argued, in countries with proportional 
representation electoral systems policies are less likely to favour consumers 
and more likely to favour producers, since the competition for the median 
voter is diminished. The more majoritarian the system is the more pro-
consumer the policies are (p. 40). 
There is some evidence for the role of producer coalitions in institutional and 
policy change in the German case. Carlin and Soskice (2009, p. 93) state that 
works councils representing skilled workers colluded with management on 
liberalizing reforms and supported flexible low-level service labour markets 
for two main reasons: (1) it implied cheaper services and therefore increased 
The paradox of liberalization 
 
 
10 
the real income of their members and (2) it implied that their members would 
bear less of the cost of prolonged unemployment.  Similarly, Palier and 
Thelen (2008, p. 51) point out the dualizing nature of reforms which have 
protected the status and privileges of labour market insiders relatively well 
and at the same time provided enough flexibility to stabilize the core.  
As a general argument, one might assume that dominant producer groups in 
coordinated political economies are not in favour of upsetting institutions that 
have served as stabilizing investments in specific skills. Rather, they have 
utilized proposals for liberal policy changes in accordance with their own 
preferences and to the disadvantage of other producer groups. Producer 
coalitions are therefore the best theoretical frame for allowing continued 
coordination and increasing liberalization taking place simultaneously.  
In the following, I will use an analysis of the transformation of the German 
political economy over the last two decades as an illustration and evidence for 
the importance of the notion of producer coalitions as driving and shaping 
policy and institutional change.  
 
3. Plant-level competitiveness and the road towards 
dualism 
When unification hit the German political economy in the early 1990s, firms 
were already under competitive pressure from Japan and East Asia, as well as 
from an overvalued exchange rate in the EMS. An extraordinary pay hike 
added to their problems in the aftermath of the unification boom. The 
subsequent recession in 1992/93 was the worst since WWII and saw a loss of 
half a million jobs in the manufacturing sector. Between 1994 and 2009, the 
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German economy devalued its real unit labour costs in relation to its 
European competitors by 20 percent (Marin, 2010a).  
Throughout the 2000s, real unit labour costs rose slower than Germany’s 
major competitors, including the Eurozone as a whole (Graph 1). Cost cutting 
was achieved through a combination of plant-level restructuring and policy 
change, which helped to reduce costs and increase productivity without 
hurting the skill base and flexibility of the manufacturing workforce.  
Off-shoring, particularly to Eastern Europe, took off in the second half of the 
1990s (Jürgens and Krzywdzinski, 2009). Some observers suggested 
organizing production by slicing up the value chain “has been more 
important for Germany’s lower unit labour costs than German workers’ wage 
restraint” (Marin, 2010b). According to estimates, German off-shoring to 
Eastern Europe boosted both the productivity of its subsidiaries in Eastern 
Europe almost threefold compared to local firms and increased the 
productivity of German based parent companies by more than 20 percent.3  
In any case relocating production to Eastern Europe made globally 
competing German firms leaner and more efficient helping them to 
win market shares in a growingly competitive world market. The 
efficiency gains from reorganising production were particularly 
pronounced after 2004 leading to a sharp fall in Germany’s relative 
unit labour costs from 2004 to 2008 (Marin, 2010b).  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3
 See for the general argument OECD (2007). 
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Marin suggests that off-shoring to Eastern Europe has also led to lower wages 
for skilled workers in Germany:  
German firms off-shored the skill intensive part of the value chain to 
exploit the low cost skilled labour available in Eastern Europe. As a 
result, the demand for this type of labour in Germany was lower, 
putting downward pressure on skilled wages in Germany. Hence, off-
shoring improved Germany’s competitiveness by increasing German 
firms’ productivity and by lowering its skilled wages (Marin, 2010b). 
In order to restructure manufacturing plants without facing trade union 
opposition, management and works councils used the plant-level concession 
bargaining tool, often coined ‘employment pacts’, introduced by Daimler-
Benz in the late 1980s. They settled agreements aimed at improving the 
competitiveness of plant, which led to more secure jobs. Both sides 
compromised: workers accepted pay cuts, longer working time and more 
flexible working patterns, while management guaranteed investments and 
promised not to resort to mass redundancies (Hassel and Rehder, 1999; 
Massa-Wirth and Seifert, 2004; Rehder, 2003; Seifert, 2002).  
 
Source: OECD 
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In comparison to concession bargaining in the US, these agreements were 
broader and less one-sided. They included measures to improve the 
infrastructure, training, costs and productivity as well as technology. The 
workforces of particular plants were rated in benchmarking comparisons and 
collaborated with local management to make the most profitable bid for 
investments. Promises by management were not legally binding, but had a 
reputation for day to day relations with works councils.  
One important component of concession bargaining was the increasing gap 
between core and peripheral workers through the out-sourcing process. 
Collective agreements were adjusted accordingly, in particular by transferring 
service components into other collective agreements and lower pay. Canteens, 
security and other service components were removed from manufacturing 
collective agreements and passed on to service sector trade unions and their 
collective agreements. Terms and conditions for workers in the service 
components of manufacturing firms drastically worsened, because their pay 
scales shifted from metal or chemical sector pay to service sector pay.  
In the late 1990s, plant-level agreements were reached in one-third of private 
sector companies. These agreements provide terms and conditions which 
deviate from the industry-wide collective agreement. Another 15 percent of 
companies simply violate the agreements, according to a survey by the union-
based Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI) (Bispinck and 
Schulten, 2003). After 2004, plant-level bargaining was officially recognized 
and regulated by an innovative collective agreement in the metal sector 
(Pforzheim Agreement). In 2006, one in ten firms in the metal sector 
negotiated an official derogation from the relevant agreement (Lehndorff, 
2010). 
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However, the price companies paid for plant-level agreements were tightened 
rules on dismissal protection for the existing workforce, rather than a more 
flexible regime of hiring and firing.  In plant-level agreements firms pledged 
to refrain from any collective dismissal for core workers for a period of 
several years. The flexibility firms gained from concession bargaining was 
internal cooperation rather than external adjustments. Unions and employers 
adjusted collective agreements to allow for plant-level deals. They introduced 
‘opening clauses’ that allow for local bargaining, provided the business 
situation is bad. Pay grades became more differentiated and lower pay grades 
were introduced. Even the trademark 35-hour work week of German trade 
unionism has been effectively abolished.  
Together with their works councils, many companies designed new work 
arrangements at the plant-level. It is virtually impossible for unions to 
monitor and police violations of collective agreements at the plant-level. Very 
few employees were prepared to sue a company for breaking an agreement, 
and unions do not have the staffing capacity to enforce or negotiate 
agreements in small and medium sized companies. Rather, firms hoped that 
competitive pressure, stubborn high unemployment and weaker trade unions 
would allow them to change the agreements, which would provide them 
internal flexibility to reduce labour costs and regain competitiveness.  
This strategy worked with union cooperation. Unions rarely blocked 
workplace deals aimed at providing job security and competitiveness, and 
did not often talk about the deals to avoid other firms from following suit. 
Protection for the workforce core and the instability for fringe workers (the 
insider-outsider problem) were complementary to each other. Firms argued 
the only way to protect core workers was to look for other ways to lower 
labour costs – at the expense of other parts of the workforce. Flexibility was 
therefore achieved in an uneven pattern.  
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Union weakness was expressed in rapidly falling union membership rates 
(Hassel, 2008) and the failure to rally enough support for industrial action. 
While the manufacturing unions, particularly IG Metall, were capable of 
forcing firms to accept union demands until the mid to late 1990s (Bavaria 
strike in 1995), the strike weapon was seriously impaired by the 2003 Saxony 
strike when the union badly lost.  
The strengthening of employment protection for permanent employees has 
been further reinforced by collective agreements in the manufacturing sector 
which over time included clauses protecting long-term employees from 
dismissal. Repeated rounds of plant-level concession bargaining, as outlined 
above, led to higher levels of employment security, at least for some groups of 
core workers (See also Zagelmeyer, 2010). For example, in September 2010 the 
electronics firm Siemens agreed to a deal with its works council giving 
unlimited employment guarantees for almost its entire workforce of more 
than 120,000 employees (Spiegelonline, 22 September 2010).  
 
4. What dualization? The transformation of the German 
labour market 
Increasing segmentation between core and peripheral employment is partly 
initiated, partly reinforced by policy changes in employment protection and 
labour market policies. Employment protection for permanent employees has 
remained strong, while employment protection for ‘irregular’ contracts (fixed-
term, agency and marginal work) has diminished. Over the years, three main 
types of irregular employment spread in the labour market: fixed-term 
contracts, temping agencies, and low-level part-time employment. Firms 
tended to push for these alternatives as flexibility buffers to protect 
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permanent employment. The move towards opening an irregular 
employment segment already started during the 1980s, but was greatly 
intensified during the 1990s and 2000s. 
Until 2003, marginal employment had been confined to workers putting in 
fewer than 15 hours per week and earning less than a low threshold of income 
as being exempted from social security contributions. Marginal employment 
status was introduced in the 1960s, when labour markets were tight and 
employers tried to entice pensioners, housewives and students to take up a 
few hours of employment without paying contributions. These groups of 
workers were covered by social insurance through their primary status (as 
pensioners, spouses or students). Over time, as contribution rates soared, 
employers increasingly used marginal employment to avoid paying 
contributions for low paid jobs. Regulatory changes aimed to increase 
employers’ tax on marginal employment in order to avoid abuse while 
retaining the concept of subsidizing marginal employment.4  
Both marginal employment and fixed-term contracts are overwhelmingly 
used by employers in service industries. Only about 10 percent of marginal 
employment is in manufacturing, while more than 80 percent are service 
sector jobs (Minijobzentrale, 2010). The prevalence of fix-term contracts varies 
across sectors with more than 20 percent in the service sector and less than 7 
percent in manufacturing (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010). This reflects the 
demand for non-standard employment in different industries. While 
manufacturing industries also benefited from the change in policy, service 
industries depended on them. In particular, part-time and marginal 
employment was a key policy instrument used to cut service costs.  
                                                        
4 With regard to further regulatory changes, the regulation of fixed term employment has been 
loosened drastically. Using the OECD scale of 0 to 4, regulatory tightness of fixed term 
employment was relaxed from 3.5 in 1990 to 0.75 in 2008. Similarly, agency work underwent 
massive deregulation from 4.0 to 1.75. At the same time, permanent employment was more 
strictly regulated from 2.58 to 3.0.  
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However, the main catalyst for cost cutting was the change in labour market 
policy in 2003. While initially driven by the need to curb public spending, 
activation policies turned out to be a major programme for subsidizing low 
skilled employment. Fiscal constraints were the key facilitators for policy 
change (Hassel and Schiller, 2009, 2010). German unification saw 
unemployment benefits and spending on active labour market measures in 
the East explode. Contribution rates for unemployment insurance doubled 
and subsidies by the federal budget to the labour agency rocketed. Social 
expenditure as part of total government spending stood at 22 percent in 1990 
and increased to 57 percent in 2000 (OECD, 2009).  
When the dotcom boom collapsed in the early 2000s, public finance problems 
accumulated on several frontiers: unemployment rose again in both eastern 
and western Germany, long-term unemployment accounted for an 
increasingly higher share of the unemployed, reunification costs rapidly 
increased, the Stability and Growth Pact started to kick in, and tax reforms 
(the Eichel tax reform) reduced tax revenue, particularly for local authorities.5 
All these developments put enormous pressure on the government to 
restructure social spending.  
The Hartz IV welfare reforms cut the maximum duration of unemployment 
benefits and limited earnings related transfers to the first year of 
unemployment (18 months for those over 55). The new long-term 
unemployed benefit (exceeding 12 months of unemployment) was a means-
tested flat rate payment and set at what was universally seen as a low level of 
social assistance (it can be topped up temporarily if a claimant previously 
received considerably higher unemployment benefits). The reform further 
                                                        
5 Their revenue from income tax declined from 21.3 to 19.8 bn; revenue local business tax 
declined from 19.3bn to 15.2 bn Euro between 2000 and 2003. In 2003, 90 percent of all local 
authorities in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia were unable to cover their expenditures. See 
Hassel and Schiller (2010: 181). 
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introduced major in-work benefits for part-time and low paid employees. 
Since all transfer recipients are required to take any job offered to them to 
prove their willingness to work, and since no statutory minimum wage has 
been set, wages can be set at extremely low levels and be topped up by 
transfer payments. About 28 percent of long-term unemployed benefit 
recipients are employed in work and receive benefits at the same time. In June 
2010 this group amounted to 1.4 million employees.6  
At the same time, benefit system reforms have not altered the high-tax wedge 
that burdens low skilled low paid work, an obstacle towards a more 
employment friendly system. Germany remains the OECD country with the 
highest marginal tax rate for low paid employment. Social security 
contributions are set at a proportional rate and kick in at a comparatively low 
threshold. The reason for non-progressive social security rates is primarily 
due to the insurance-based welfare state, which draws on employers and 
employee contributions equally. This is also partly the reason for the high 
number of marginal jobs described above. While marginal employment is 
exempted from contributions, full-time employment for low paid workers is 
taxed at a rate of 36 percent (Immervoll, 2007). The strong pressure on 
unemployed to take up low paid employment and a new system of topping 
up income with partial benefits create strong incentives for low skilled 
workers to take up part-time employment for very low wages and 
simultaneously draw social security benefits.  
As a result of policy change, the trend of declining male employment rates, 
particularly elderly men, reversed beginning in 2003. Both overall 
employment rates and the absolute number of people in employment have 
increased. A study commissioned by the Bertelsmann Foundation in 2010 
                                                        
6 Datensammlung Erwerbstätigkeit und Leistungsbezug nach dem SGB II, 2007 - 2010, 
Sozialpolitik aktuell, Universität Duisburg-Essen. 
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summarizes: “Germany reached a historical high point of employment in 2009 
and exceeded other countries’ employment rates. At the same time, levels of 
inactivity have declined” (Eichhorst et al. 2009, p. 4). Labour market 
participation of women and elderly workers increased. The employment rate 
increased by 4 percentage points between 2004 and 2008 and unemployment 
levels are below average (which is mainly due to short-term working and the 
effects of the financial crisis). Inactivity is no longer a problem of the German 
labour market.  
However, the structure of the German labour market has dramatically 
changed in the process. The number of full-time jobs has decreased by 20 
percent, while the number of part-time and marginal employment has 
drastically increased. The rate of part-time employment doubled between 
1991 and 2007 and the number of marginal employment rocketed.  
The economic upswing after 2005 showed a different trend. From 2006 on, 
unemployment decreased faster than any other time in post-war German 
history, from 4.8 million unemployed on average in 2005 to 3.2 million in 
2008, the lowest level since 1992. This is more remarkable, because the 
German definition of the unemployed and ‘able to work’ includes all benefit 
seekers capable of working more than three hours per day. This is more than 
90 percent of all those who claimed social assistance in 2005.  
890,000 new jobs, 210,000 full-time and 590,000 part-time, were created during 
the most recent economic upswing in 2006/2007. In contrast to earlier periods, 
the share of full-time jobs has increased again. The share of ‘proper jobs’ 
compared to marginal employment are significantly higher than in previous 
economic upswings (Koch et al., 2009, p. 236). Long-term unemployment also 
decreased faster than in previous periods of economic recovery (Gartner and 
Klinger, 2008, p. 442). 1.7 percent of economic growth was needed in 1999 to 
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create additional employment; this threshold now stands at 1.3 percent 
(Gartner and Klinger, 2008, p. 445).  
However, many full-time positions are now offered as temporary jobs or 
agency work. Between 2006 and 2007, agency work increased by 64 percent. 
The initial pay rate for agency work is 7 Euro and therefore below the rate 
unions want to see as a minimum wage (Vanselow, 2009, p. 3).  
Survey data show that the unemployed are increasingly willing to take jobs 
below their skill levels, for lower pay and with worse terms and conditions. 
Those employed are also more willing to accept concessions in exchange for 
job security (Kettner and Rebien 2009, pp. 6- 7).  
The downside of the labour market activation is the rapid increase of low pay. 
Since the mid-1990s, low pay has been constantly rising. Between 1998 and 
2007, the share of low paid among all workers shot up from 14.2 percent to 
21.5 percent (Kalina and Weinkopf, 2009, pp. 3). In European comparison, 
Germany and the Netherlands were the only countries in which the share of 
low paid jobs increased between 1995 und 2000. In 2000, only the UK (19.4 
percent), Ireland (18.7 percent) and the Netherlands (16.6 percent) had higher 
shares of low pay employment than Germany (Bosch and Kalina, 2007, p. 27). 
The share of low paid has since increased and was only topped in 2005 by the 
US (Carlin and Soskice, 2009, p. 77). Low pay is not confined to the unskilled; 
the share of low paid skilled workers rose from 58.5 percent in 1995 to 70.8 
percent in 2007 (Kalina and Weinkopf 2009, p. 6). Low pay is gradually 
diffusing into the core of the labour market; whereas it used to be 
concentrated in atypical work, it is now found in full and part-time 
employment and standard jobs. The majority of those low paid are women, 
though the share of men is rising. In terms of quantity, marginal employment 
has been the most important form of irregular employment. In 2007, marginal 
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employment accounted for 7 million employees, with the highest 
concentration in retail (Minijobzentrale, 2010). 
Fixed term employment has increased significantly over the last two decades. 
In 2008, about 2.7 million of the 30.07 million employees were on a fixed term 
contract, which accounted for a share of 5.7 percent (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
2009). This number excludes trainees and students. Temping agency work 
also increased rapidly. In 2009, 1.6 percent of all employees worked for 
temping agencies, an increase of 53 percent over 2 years (Eichhorst, 2010). In 
total, however, fixed term employment and workers employed by temping 
agencies still account for less than 10 percent of the workforce (Eichhorst and 
Marx, 2009, p. 14).  
The increase of irregular and marginal employment must be seen in the 
context of firms’ attempts to increase or maintain job security for core 
workers. As in many southern and eastern European countries, governments, 
employers and unions jointly preferred the deregulation of the peripheral 
labour market over the deregulation/liberalization of employment protection 
for the core workforce. As a consequence, the dualism of insiders and 
outsiders on the labour market has deepened, regarding both the number of 
workers affected and the degree of regulatory differences. 
Overall, the experience is therefore mixed. More employment is combined 
with low pay and insecure employment. Studies have shown that low paid 
employment does not usually serve as a path to better paid work. In a survey 
of 30,000 low paid full-time workers in 1998/99, only 13 percent managed to 
find better work by 2005 (Koch et al., 2009, pp. 249-250).  
Activating the long-term unemployed has therefore not solved the structural 
problems of the German labour market. Germany still has the highest 
unemployment rate among the unskilled in the western world. The labour 
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market is increasingly segmented into core and periphery. Underemployment 
has emerged and women with children work very few hours compared to 
mothers in other countries. The Hartz-IV reforms have thereby introduced a 
form of negative income tax (or in-work benefits) in which low paid 
employment is topped up by benefits. In absence of a statutory minimum 
wage, these forms of combined income further drive down wages already at 
the bottom end of the labour market.7  
 
 
5. The effects of dualization and the challenge of the 
service economy 
So far, I have argued that firms reacted to economic shocks by fostering 
cooperation and off-shoring non-core parts of the production either abroad or 
by subcontracting to cheaper service suppliers. Government policy has 
liberalized employment legislation and social policy for non-core workers. 
Liberalization and coordination can therefore go hand in hand, leading to a 
segmented and dualist political economy. In this section, I will argue that 
dualism between different segments of the economy is also complementary 
and mutually dependent. In other words, Germany’s competitiveness in 
manufacturing sectors does not only depend on collaboration with works 
councils at the plant-level but also on liberalization of the service economy. 
Moreover, the same institutional set up which protects exporting industries 
helps to liberalize the service sector.  
                                                        
7 About 57% of Western and 41% of East German employees are covered by collective 
agreements which contain a minimum wage. For those not covered by collective agreements, 
minimum wages exist for specific sectors such as construction and cleaning via the extension of 
sectoral collective agreements. In other sectors (in particular postal  services) the extension of 
collective agreements has been legally challenged. A minimum wage for temping agencies was 
introduced in May 2011.  
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The development of wages in the service economy is one example of how 
dualization feeds directly into the cost cutting of manufacturing firms. In 
contrast to other European countries, manufacturing cost cutting in Germany 
was helped rather than counteracted by service sector pay setting. In many 
other countries of the Eurozone, pay restraint was achieved in the exposed 
sectors, but not in the sheltered sectors. Therefore, pay rises in services 
outstripped the manufacturing sectors. 
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In Germany and Austria, cost cutting in manufacturing was accompanied by 
an even fiercer cost cutting in services (Johnston, 2009). Over time, service 
wages fell relatively to manufacturing wages, even though these sectors were 
sheltered sectors not under international competition. Graph 4 shows the 
development of service sector wages in relation to manufacturing wages. In 
all parts of the service sector, wages fell below manufacturing wages. The 
graph illustrates how hourly pay in finance, insurance and real estate was 
higher than manufacturing pay, right up until the late 1980s. Since the late 
1980s, hourly wages in services have grown even less than in manufacturing 
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despite the persisting pay restraint in manufacturing. In the hotel and 
restaurant sectors particularly, wages today are less than half than what they 
are in manufacturing industries. During the 1970s they were at 80 percent of 
manufacturing pay.  
The origins of this particularly severe wage restraint in the service sectors are 
not obvious. Johnston (2009, p. 26) attributes it to the pattern bargaining of 
Germany’s wage bargaining system:  
A similar constraint on sheltered sector wage setters might also exist 
in countries where inter-industry coordination of wage bargaining 
remains strong. Austria and Germany provide notable examples: both 
have pattern bargaining systems where wage-setters in all sectors 
shadow the metalworking sector. The metalworking sector (IG Metall 
in Germany and GMT in Austria), leads negotiations, setting wage 
increases equal to the increase in the national aggregate labour 
productivity rate. All other sectoral unions then shadow these 
increases, using them as a target, but rarely reaching them unless their 
sectoral productivity levels permit it. 
In addition to pattern bargaining, which prevents service sectors from 
catching up with wage developments in manufacturing, liberalization policies 
themselves have contributed to a wage decline in services. Atypical 
employment, such as temping or part-time work are concentrated in the 
service economy and heavily oversubscribed by women workers. High labour 
costs have driven retail and restaurant firms to staff predominantly female 
part-time workers, who work in small workplaces with no union 
representation. Wages have stagnated or even fallen behind as a consequence 
of fierce competition in services, low unionization and outsider staffing. 
Three more reasons can account for weak service sector pay. First, in the wake 
of reunification, collective agreements were hastily transferred to the Eastern 
states. In manufacturing, trade unions ensured that wage levels were at an 
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appropriate level, compared with the West. In many services sectors where 
unionization was weak, unions settled for very low wages in order to reach 
an agreement, since many employers were rather reluctant to enter collective 
bargaining. They thereby established a low wage floor for service sector pay. 
Second, the absence of a national minimum wage, which prevents wages from 
falling to incredibly low levels, has contributed to a downward wage drift. 
Third, a range of subsidies for low wages encouraged service sector workers 
to accept low wages in exchange for additional transfers. Activation policies, 
intended to increase labour market participation, came at the price of low 
wages concentrated in services.  
As a consequence, manufacturing and low skilled service sector firms now 
work under different institutional regimes. Manufacturing is organized 
around a body of skilled high productivity core workers which is protected 
against economic insecurity. Low skilled services operate under conditions 
that are similar to labour markets in liberal market economies.8 
The capacity of service sector unions, primarily Verdi, to protect and raise 
wages by campaigning for a national minimum wage, for instance, is thus 
severely limited by the opposition of manufacturing unions. The same is true 
for limits on wage subsidies and the creation of social security exemptions for 
low skilled jobs. Both are accepted and even encouraged by manufacturing 
unions, whose members benefit from low cost services.  
Finally, the wage restraint in manufacturing and wage decline in services are 
directly linked to weak domestic demand and explain the export dependency 
of the German economy. The incremental but increasing institutional 
                                                        
8 This is reemphasized by the fact that employment protection is annulled for minimal offences 
against employers. A string of court decisions in unfair dismissal cases have held up the view that 
a shop worker with 30 years tenure can be fired for taking food or minimal amounts of money 
from the till.   
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specialization into a two sector dual economy has led to a development trap 
of an export dependent equilibrium.  
This in turn creates several problems for the domestic economy. One problem 
is the training of young school graduates. Low pay in services has reduced 
the incentives for school leavers to enter three year apprenticeships in the 
service sector, especially if the pay for trained workers barely exceeds pay for 
the unskilled. It also undermines coordination in services, as workers do not 
trust employment security or skill based employment in services. As the 
economy deindustrializes9, this schism will either be reinforced into a dual 
economy or turn into a major source of conflict due to the service industries’ 
different skill and pay structure needs. Combined with different types of 
demand for social security and redistribution by service sector employees 
(particularly part-time women) with higher turnover, this might turn into the 
biggest challenge. 
 
6. Germany’s recovery in the financial crisis 
When regarding the trends of the last two decades, it becomes clear how the 
German economy owes its recovery to the process of fostered coordination in 
a context of service sector liberalization outlined in the preceding sections. 
The German economy was hit comparatively late by the financial crisis. The 
outlook for the German economy was relatively optimistic until the fall of 
2008. The Council of Economic Advisors forecasted 1.8 percent growth for 
2008 (SVR, 2008.). This supported the government’s view that the crisis would 
be confined to the US and other financial centres. However, the German 
                                                        
9 According to the STAN database of the OECD the share of manufacturing employment in 
Germany declined drastically from 28.3% to 20.7% between 1990 and 2000 and then slightly to 
18.5% in 2009 (OECD; http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx; data extracted on 12 July 2011).  
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economy began to shrink in the last quarter of 2008. In early 2009, exports and 
manufacturing collapsed. By the second quarter of 2009, the German economy 
had shrunk by more than 6 percent in comparison to the second quarter of 
2008, which registered a more disastrous performance than the countries 
which had ‘caused’ the crisis (Bodegan et al., 2010). 
Since then, the German economy has seen an extraordinary development. It 
had the steepest decline, followed by the fastest recovery, among all OECD 
countries (Graph 3). The effects have been most dramatic in the 
manufacturing sector, given the extreme dependency on the export of 
manufactured goods.  
 
Source: OECD. 
The recovery has been helped by the contribution of the German welfare 
system’s automatic stabilizers and the two stimulus packages, November 5, 
2008 in the amount of 11.8 billion Euro and on January 27, 2009 of 
approximately 50 billion Euro. In total, the German contribution to global 
demand stood slightly above the OECD average (Hassel and Lütz, 2010). Of 
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these, the German equivalent of the ‘Cash for Clunkers’ programme 
(amounting to 5 billion Euros) subsidized car manufacturers worldwide. In 
particular, the cash for clunkers programme protected core skilled workers in 
export oriented industries.  
At the same time, the labour market was relatively protected from the slump’s 
fall-out. The elasticity of employment relative to the gross domestic product 
(GDP) was the second lowest among the EU (European Commission, 2010), 
meaning the GDP loss did not translate into job losses. As a result, Germany 
was the only major country which emerged from the crisis with lower 
unemployment levels than before the crisis (Graph 4).  
 
Source: OECD; note: 2010 refers to Q3. 
As the OECD points out, the single most important explanation for the gap 
between the business slump and employment outcomes is the reduction of 
working hours (Lehndorff, 2010; OECD, 2010). Manufacturing firms hoarded 
their permanent staff by employing various measures: they cut back on 
overtime, used deposits on working-time accounts, reduced working-time 
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and used the public short-time provisions, which were extended as part of the 
stimulus package. In total, these measures were used by about a fifth of all 
firms. According to a plant-level survey by WSI, 30 percent of all firms used 
working time accounts in order to avoid dismissals. This was by far the most 
important adjustment mechanism. Other mechanisms were job rotation (14 
percent), extra holidays (13 percent) and pay cuts (11 percent) (Bodegan et al., 
2009). 
Labour hoarding enabled German firms to rebuild capacity quickly, as 
demand on world markets picked up. Unlike in liberal market economies, 
where downswings are immediately translated into redundancy, labour 
hoarding stabilized demand and protected the skills of the workers 
concerned. This was also reflected in the change of unit labour costs. While 
hoarding labour first pushed up unit labour costs in 2009, it decreased in 
2010. Labour hoarding and the use of working time accounts was only 
possible due to the plant-level agreements German firms had negotiated with 
their core workforce beginning in the late 1980s.  
In the midst of the financial crisis, the German economy reported a 
remarkable recovery of the competitive position of German firms, higher than 
average growth and the highest employment levels ever (Möller, 2010). We 
can therefore recognize the two components which contributed to this 
remarkable development: first, German firms used flexible adjustment tools 
which they had developed over the two decades since the post-unification 
crisis. Second, public policy, particularly the specific measure of short term 
working, contributed to employment stabilization during the crisis.  
However, analysis of the recovery only briefly mentions the extent to which 
wage subsidies for the low skilled, the lack of a minimum wage and wage 
decline in the service sector have served as a cost containing environment, 
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allowing export-oriented firms to contain their wages and unit labour costs. 
The increasingly dualist nature of the German economy has created an 
export-oriented high skill industry which depends on a domestic 
environment of low cost services to control labour costs. This model, which is 
questionable in its social and economic long-run effects, is specific to the 
interactions of wage bargaining institutions, social and employment policies 
and training institutions.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Maintaining and regaining competitiveness for manufacturing firms has been 
a driving force in restructuring the German political economy. Firms have 
responded to economic shocks by restructuring; while public policy has 
aimed to accommodate and support manufacturing competitiveness with 
social policy liberalization which has helped to contain costs in the service 
economy. Both have contributed to deepening dualism.  
Thus, the adjustment trajectory of the German political economy entails 
continued coordination and liberalization. These are not opposites; rather, 
they are complementary. Sustained coordination requires increasing 
liberalization for the labour market fringe. The result is an increasing inner 
core of predominantly manufacturing firms who hire a mix and match of core 
and fringe employees for their plants.  
The combination of the two is the most important underlying factor for 
Germany’s recent recovery following the financial crisis. The competitiveness 
of German firms  hinges not only on wage restraint and plant-level cost 
cutting exercises in the manufacturing sectors, but also on cost cutting service 
supplies that facilitate wage restraint.  
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Analysing the complementary workings of coordination and liberalization 
helps understanding the apparent contradictory accounts of the 
transformation of German capitalism. Moreover, it points to the drivers of 
change. Both features of the German political economy - continued 
coordination and liberalization of services – are best explained by 
highlighting the role of producer coalitions in policy and institutional change.  
On the whole, the business community has not pressed for wholesale 
deregulation of labour market regulation as the power resource approach 
would expect. At the same time, some segments of the business community, 
representing the core of manufacturing industries, pursued strategies to 
regain competitiveness at the local level. Management allied with core 
workers in its quest for productivity increases. Policy changes accommodated 
these strategies and enabled cost containment in the service sector. 
The preceding interpretation of the German case as an emerging dualism of 
coordination and liberalization based on producer coalition preferences 
implies that this development might be a typical if not stable pattern of 
adjustment of a coordinated market economy to a series of economic shocks. 
It therefore allows a more nuanced perspective on institutional change in 
advanced political economies and provides a fruitful starting point for further 
analysis.    
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